By Bob Bowker
Photo: Supporters of the Egyptian military rally in Tahrir Square, Cairo. (Kha;ed Desouki)
Will Egypt's top general ride a wave of popular support to office? Will the Muslim Brotherhood boycott any new elections? Whatever happens next, the military will make sure that it maintains ultimate control in case things go pear-shaped again, writes Bob Bowker.
Egyptian politics is at a turning point. The balance that will emerge in coming weeks between civilian political forces and the Egyptian military, and the place of the Islamist forces in that balance, is shaping up as issue that will shape Egypt for many years.
There are multiple uncertain elements in the equation. The Chief of the Egyptian Defence Force, General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, is riding a wave of popular support from anti-Islamist elements because of the role he personally and the military played in bringing about the removal of Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi.
Al-Sisi has denied planning to stand in due course for the presidency. However, adulatory media treatment including comparisons to Gamal Abdel Nasser suggest such a possibility should not be excluded when those elections are called.
Al-Sisi has also been the subject of considerable speculation so far as his personal political values are concerned. Not only has the media highlighted his image as a devout Muslim, but analysis of some of his written coursework while undertaking training in the United States also suggests he may be disposed to support at least a higher level of recognition by government of Islamic values in Egyptian society than many of his secular supporters would prefer.
Looking ahead, that possibility adds to the complexity of dealings between the Egyptian military, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamist and secular political opinion.
The manner in which the ongoing standoff on the streets of Cairo between the supporters of Morsi and the security forces may unfold is impossible to predict. Neither side is comfortable with a standoff, but so far, both sides continue to see good reasons to avoid further violence.
Large scale loss of life would be tragic for the individuals concerned, and would deepen the polarisation of Egyptian society still further, without commensurate benefit to either side. It would be condemned abroad, and could ultimately encourage a return to the sporadic terrorism of the 1990s.
Of the opposing sides in the stalemate, however, the Brotherhood is in the greater bind. Within a matter of weeks the interim government hopes to produce a revised draft constitution and proceed to call parliamentary and presidential elections. Brotherhood leaders appear undecided whether they should boycott those processes.
The Islamist side of the equation is not going to accept rule by anti-Islamists. The political base of the pro-Morsi camp may disintegrate if it concedes any legitimacy to the interim government.
Almost all the senior figures of the Brotherhood are now in prison and Al-Sisi is riding high. The Brotherhood would face an uphill battle to preserve its political credibility if its woes were to be exacerbated by a massive electoral defeat.
The temptation will be strong to fall back into their familiar oppositional, conspiratorially-minded comfort zone and reject electoral participation in order to preserve its organisational discipline and the capacity to fight elections another day.
For its part, the scale of its crackdown on the Brotherhood leaders suggests a strong possibility the military is aiming to restore the pre-2011 order (minus Mubarak) under the rhetoric of anti-terrorism.
Given the strength of religious sentiment among the Egyptian population at large, the military will be at pains to avoid being seen as anti-Islamic.
The military have time on their side and the upper hand in terms of capacity ultimately to use legally-mandated coercive force. They seem reasonably assured of continuing financial support from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states for the economy so long as they are set on removing the Muslim Brotherhood as a political factor in Egypt's future.
However, neither the coercive capacity of the regime nor any willingness to compromise which might emerge in time on the Islamist side will be as strong as in the days under Mubarak. At that time, unlike today, for the Brotherhood at least, the struggle was difficult but not existential, the political audience was fairly docile, and the economy was performing reasonably well.
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Of those Islamist elements, the most important will probably be the main rival to the Brotherhood, the salafist party, al-Nour, whose leadership has been careful to distance itself from Morsi. Al-Nour has long enjoyed good relations with the Saudis as well as having enjoyed a degree of tolerance, if not coordination, with the military during the Mubarak era, as a politically quietist counterweight to the Brotherhood with a high level of grassroots credibility.
Moreover, a combination of political strength and complementarity of interests between the salafists and the military; the perpetual incoherence and back-biting among the secular political forces; the inexperience and diversity of the popular movement which took to the streets in July; and the ongoing absence of popular respect for the established opposition could mean that the secular elements of Egyptian politics may emerge as the main losers, after the Brotherhood, in the allocation of political spoils in coming weeks.
The honeymoon between the Egyptian military and its political audience is unlikely to last indefinitely.
The honeymoon with the police and security service will end before long: they were unpopular under Mubarak, mostly for reasons to do with their lack of accountability. Their stripes have not changed. Major unresolved issues of transitional justice and internal security reform remain to be addressed, and the inclination of the military to proceed in that direction is questionable.
The honeymoon between the Egyptian military and its political audience is also unlikely to last indefinitely. But if it does, and his personal inclinations as reported are anything to go by, al-Sisi may well see the path ahead as having a strong Islamic orientation, especially if he believes the political challenge from the Brotherhood has been ended but the need to reach out to conservative opinion remains strong.
This is where the going becomes even harder to forecast. The al-Nour rank and file are clearly concerned at the ambivalence of their party leadership's stance toward the military, especially after so much blood has been spilled. Some of those in the streets supporting Morsi are al-Nour sympathisers.
On the other hand, serious misgivings will quickly re-emerge among the secular and liberal elements of Egyptian society if the constitutional revisions that emerge in coming weeks maintain the elements secured by the salafists and the Brotherhood in the 2012 constitution; if the provisions in that constitution according special status to the military remain in place; and if the influence of the privileged elements of the Mubarak regime as well as Saudi Arabia appear to be on the rise.
For their part, there is little reason to doubt that the Egyptian military would rather not be responsible for day to day politics and issues beyond national defence and security. But they do not yet have a credible exit strategy. And while they favour elections in principle, they will pay close attention to ensuring that the enabling systems of democracy preserve their ultimate control for the long term if they cannot resolve the Islamist question to their satisfaction.
Egypt is a long way from reaching the end of the tunnel into which it has entered.
Bob Bowker is Adjunct Professor in the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University. He was non-resident Australian ambassador to Syria from 2005 to 2008, and served in Damascus from 1979 to 1981. View his full profile here.
Egypt: back to the future? - The Drum (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
