By Ken Fraser
Photo: There is only one solution acceptable to both sides. (Reuters: Kevin Lamarque)
Russia won't willingly withdraw from Crimea and the West seems unlikely to force the matter, so the question remaining is how this reaches what appears to be a foregone conclusion, writes Ken Fraser.
When responding to Russia's military engagement in Crimea, US president Barack Obama said: "There will be costs for any military intervention in Ukraine."
This is the key to understanding the current situation. Leaving aside the point that this statement might well be as true for the US and NATO as they would be for Russian president Vladimir Putin, the core of the message here is that the US is not getting close to actually committing itself to protecting the eastern-leaning part of Ukraine.
What Obama is saying to Putin in this speech is that, as far as the US is concerned, Russia may go ahead and occupy Crimea and secure its access to the city of Sevastopol and basing for its Black Sea fleet. For the time being. In return for this effective partitioning of the country, NATO gets the installation of a friendly government in Kiev. This has the effect of clicking over another notch in the ratchet of encroachment of NATO influence into the former Soviet republics. Putin knows he has lost this notch, but everyone knows that asking him to give up Sevastopol is asking too much.
Of course, the US cannot simply agree to all this in public, which is why the message is coded in these terms. It will still have to protest, and strongly. It might boycott the G8 in Sochi. There may be cooling diplomatic relations and a certain amount of isolation. The UN will express "grave concerns". Fine statements of principal will be mandatory. Hence Obama's insubstantial statements that "any violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity would be a profound interference in matters that must be determined by the Ukrainian people", and, "The Ukrainian people have also reminded us that human beings have a human universal right to determine their own future."
These are the "costs" to which Obama is referring. In a few years everyone will have forgotten about all this and relations can return to normal with the new reality in place. But Obama's speech - for its talk about "sovereignty, territorial integrity and democratic future" - falls well short of the specific actions implied by commitments like "everything possible", for which the new Ukrainian government is calling, or the standard "all necessary means", authorisation for war. The costs, in other words, will be bearable, and may be minimal.
Incidentally, note the terminology of the democratic future. The US supports the right of the Ukrainian people to determine their own future, as long as that future is democratic and broadly consistent with Western consumerist individualism. The Russians can make a similar claim about the self-determination of Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Hence Putin's statement that "Moscow reserved the right to protect its own interests and those of Russian speakers in the event of violence breaking out in eastern Ukraine and Crimea". These are classic irredentist tropes.
This whole discourse will be crystal clear in the Kremlin, which is part of the point. Everybody knows that it would be a bad idea to push Putin into a position where he has to resist. Russian withdrawal from what it has now occupied would be a potentially mortal blow to Putin's career and to his project of reviving the Russian Bear. He has everything to lose. He can't take a step back, and this makes him dangerous.
The decision, I suggest, has already been made. Why? Because it is the only solution acceptable to both sides, and, let's be clear: while the situation on the ground is messy, there are really only two sides in this grander game. One difficulty for both sides is to achieve the end result without having to go through the tedious and unpopular process of a bloody civil war. Such a scenario can be avoided by having the issue played out in civilised fashion among those who really decide what happens. But whether it comes about through war or diplomacy, the eventual outcome will probably be the same (though war remains a highly uncertain business).
And then, of course, there are all those intercontinental missiles. This is the end-game that really keeps policy-makers awake at night, and is the underlying structural imperative to settle the matter. This means no red lines from the White House. It means "costs", not "all necessary means". It means "support for", not a guarantee of, Ukrainian territorial integrity. It means the Russians know that, whatever the rhetoric from Western leaders, they are highly unlikely to go any nearer to the brink of war than Putin has already taken them. This means he gets Crimea, but the slow strangling of the Bear continues. NATO still wins. It is manoeuvring with knights and bishops. Putin has had to bring out his queen.
Ken Fraser is currently coordinating a course on International Relations Theory at the Australian National University. View his full profile here.
Russia will get Crimea (but the West still wins) - The Drum (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
