By Bob Bowker
Egypt president's calm before the storm - The Drum (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
Photo: It remains to be seen how Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will perform in using his newly-acquired authority. (AFP: Mahmoud Khaled)
Egypt's president-to-be will have a brief window to start real reform before the realities of terrorism, a struggling economy and an expectant military come to the fore, writes Bob Bowker.
The next six months will see a period of relative calm in Egyptian politics, reflecting a strong popular desire, above all else, for the return of a more authoritarian style of rule. The repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters will continue, alongside the quelling of other dissenting voices.
The real challenges lie 18 months ahead.
Despite his popularity at present, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will not be a populist president. His accessibility to the public will be limited by security concerns. Financial stringency, including efforts to wind back unsustainably high fuel subsidies will be required to address a burgeoning budget deficit that Egypt's Gulf backers will not support indefinitely.
Sisi's political style - strong on paternal imagery and light on detail - reflects his military background. He exudes confidence that the political tide is running in his favour. But that self-assurance is bound to be tested as he turns to address the challenges of developing and implementing credible programs, rather than suggesting ad hoc initiatives in response to Egypt's economic situation.
Absent such programs, that situation looks set to worsen. The Egyptian government already owes as much as $8 billion to foreign energy companies, with the external debt probably growing at about $700 million a month. It also faces the prospect of rising costs for wheat imports as suppliers insure their sales against default. A major challenge in refinancing domestic borrowing looms in 2015.
The tourism sector is barely alive, with hope pinned on a recovery after the summer if terrorist attacks can be prevented. Like tourism, a return of foreign direct investment from western sources will hinge mostly on a perception that Egypt has returned to something akin to the predictability of the Mubarak years. Education, health services and infrastructure all require urgent overhauls.
Meanwhile, however, fundamental questions about Egypt's future remain unanswered. Can a state-oriented economy deliver sufficient economic growth to keep within manageable political limits the expectations and aspirations of ordinary young Egyptians for economic security and dignity? And can the Egyptian system deliver the reforms that will be required for that to happen?
The evidence to date suggests a high risk of failure on both counts. The civil service remains somnolent and unwieldy. The outputs of the judicial system are, to put it mildly, idiosyncratic. The efforts, under the Morsi government, to address high-level corruption have been impeded, if not halted by the return to military-based rule. The privileged business community of the Mubarak era strongly supported a Sisi victory but issues of transitional justice remain to be resolved. Terror attacks have continued, with links to the ongoing insurgency in the Sinai. There is little prospect in coming months of an easing of the travel advisories and restrictions that have decimated the tourism sector.
It also remains to be seen how Sisi will perform in using his newly-acquired authority. The latest Egyptian constitution allows for the possibility of a stronger presidency. But it also provides scope for greater separation of powers between the military, executive, judiciary and parliament, each of which is bound to resist any encroachment upon their roles.
One thing is certain: the Egyptian military will not give the president unqualified support unless he appears to be succeeding, in equal measure, in quashing the Brotherhood, protecting the state from internal threats and looking after their interests.Sisi's support base - the poor and ill-educated on one hand, and the wealthy upper class on the other - also displays contrasting demands. The poor demand economic security and protection against economic duress; the rich insist that priority has to be accorded to restoring financial sustainability and restoring a predictable business environment upon which welfare schemes may be based.
One thing is certain: the Egyptian military will not give the president unqualified support unless he appears to be succeeding, in equal measure, in quashing the Brotherhood, protecting the state from internal threats and looking after their interests. Nor will it allow itself to be dragged down by him if he is seen to be failing to command popular support.
There is a brief window of political opportunity for Sisi to show he is capable of improving the economic situation of ordinary Egyptians. Even evidence of modest changes for the better would have a significant impact on his political shelf life.
But if he fails to do so, by the late summer of 2015 there is a distinct possibility that the Egyptian government, as it faces deepening economic and social challenges, will become even more repressive. Should that happen, the government will be less confident and less willing to risk implementing painful but necessary reforms.
If the military divides over its assessment of Sisi's leadership (and the appointment of his son-in-law as chief of the defence force adds a further potential complication in that respect) there will be damage to the standing of the one institution upon which most ordinary Egyptians now rest their hopes.
The international community should continue to criticize abuses of human rights and the restriction of political freedoms in Egypt. But few Egyptians would agree at this juncture that a more open and inclusive political order would be in Egypt's interests. Nor, in fairness, would there be any guarantee that more empowerment, inclusiveness and respect for human rights would achieve a restoration of notions of constitutionality, or build a sense of political equilibrium between Egypt's contending forces.
Egypt is what it is - impenetrable to outsiders, its military embraced by the Saudis and Emiratis for political and strategic reasons, and its population largely impervious to external advice, criticism and ridicule alike. Its future and that of much else besides now rests on the shoulders of an individual whose commitment to the nation is clear. But Egypt's willingness to be led by him, or any other figure, remains in doubt. And whether Sisi has the vision and skill and capacity to pursue a reformist agenda while he leads his country is far from certain.
Bob Bowker is Adjunct Professor in the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University. View his full profile here.
